Convert or Revert?
Summary: The article argues that calling new Muslims "reverts" is both linguistically and theologically indefensible. The hadith "every child is born on fiṭrah" is the usual justification, but the author contends it means humanity is predisposed toward godly subservience — not that every person was once in a state of active submission and then abandoned it. Medieval scholars like al-Nawawī and Ibn al-Qayyim are cited in support. To call someone a "revert" would logically imply they were previously believers who apostatised — an obvious absurdity. The Arabic term for submitting to God is aslama, which carries no sense of returning. Jews and Christians who accept the final message are a special case: they are better understood as progressing to an update of the same Abrahamic covenant, having always been muslimīn in disposition as 28:52-54 explicitly states. The author also criticises the English usage itself: "revert" as a noun is a linguistic invention, and its connotation of regression sits poorly with how believers ought to present themselves publicly. Finally, in the British context specifically, the label "convert" functions less as theology and more as an ethnic marker — which the author treats as a further reason to abandon it.
"What is the ruling on…?” or "What's the strongest opinion…?”
Summary: The article challenges the common assumption that religious questions have one definitive answer. Most procedural matters in God's law are genuinely open to multiple legitimate interpretations, meaning that when someone asks "what is the ruling on X," they are really asking for a jurist's informed opinion — not retrieving an objective fact. Only a limited set of decisive matters carry definitive rulings. Good jurisprudence, the author argues, requires locating individual rulings within the broader covenantal framework rather than treating each in isolation. A ruling divorced from its wider purpose is like a brick without a wall — technically present but structurally meaningless. Practically, this means people should seek out genuine intellectual aptitude rather than social media popularity, rhetorical flair, or sectarian familiarity. Both the instinct toward maximum restriction and the instinct toward maximum leniency can be equally corrupted by group loyalty or self-interest rather than honest engagement with what God actually intends. The mark of a trustworthy jurist is rigorous knowledge of the sources, coherent reasoning, sensitivity to context, and the humility — as al-Shāfiʿī put it — to hold one's own conclusions firmly while remaining open to a variant perspective.